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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

if the third-party defendant had been impleaded before the statute of
limitations on plaintiff's claim had expired 13) and unsalvable despite
CPLR 203(e). The court reasoned that the second situation was more
closely analogous and denied the motion for leave to amend. Thus,
although it cannot be gainsaid that the party received notice of the
transaction or occurrence sought to be proved by the amended pleading, the court has limited the operation of CPLR 203(e) to claims
asserted by an amended pleading against a party in the same status in
which he was originally summoned.
CPLR 205(a): Dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction does not bar
commencement of second action where defendant has been properly
served.
CPLR 205(a) permits a diligent suitor to commence a new action,
upon the same cause of action, 14 within six months from the termination of a prior action, if the earlier action was timely commenced and
was not terminated by voluntary discontinuance, dismissal for neglect
to prosecute,'6 or final judgment on the merits. 16 Consequently, a party
is enabled to escape the harsh effects of the statute of limitations by
demonstrating that the prior action had been "timely commenced."
The initiation of an action in good faith 17 by service of process constitutes timely commencement, even though the forum selected by the
plaintiff lacks subject matter jurisdiction.' S Where, however, the defendant is not properly served, the beneficial aspects of CPLR 205 are
deemed inapposite. 9
In Amato v. Svedi 20 plaintiff commenced an action in the New
12 McCabe v. Queensboro Farm Prods. Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 553, 223 N.Y.S.2d 21 (2d
Dep't), aff'd, 11 N.Y2d 963, 183 N.E.2d 326, 229 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1962).
13 Trybus v. Nipark Realty Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 563, 271 N.Y.S.2d 5 (2d Dep't 1966).
14 Under CPA 23, a new action was permitted on "the same cause." Hence, a plaintiff
was allowed to commence a second action for breach of warranty after the dismissal of an
action for fraud. Titus v. Poole, 145 N.Y. 414, 40 N.E. 228 (1895). Notwithstanding the
variance in language, it has been held that Titus is still good law under the CPLR.
Kavanau v. Virtis Co., 32 App. Div. 2d 754, 800 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Ist Dep't 1969) (quantum
meruit claim permitted after dismissal of action for breach of contract). See generally 7B

McKINNEY's CPLR 205, supp. commentary at 46-47 (1970).

15 For a discussion of dismissals other than those warranted by CPIR 3216 which will
bar the commencement of a second action, see 7B McKINNY'S CPLR 205, supp. commentaries at 47-48, 49 (1968, 1966, 1965).
16 For an interesting application of this section, see Buchholz v. United States Fire
Ins. Co., 269 App. Div. 2d 49, 53 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1st Dep't 1945).
17 "The rule of the statute was enacted to meet the exigencies of the ordinary rather
than the exceptional case, to save the rights of the honest rather than the fraudulent
suitor." Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 541, 109 N.E. 594, 596 (1915).
1S Id.

19 Erickson v. Macy, 236 N.Y. 412, 140 N.E. 938 (1923) (service pursuant to a void order of publication).
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York City Civil Court, Queens County, to recover damages for an assault allegedly committed by a Suffolk County resident in Suffolk
County. The action was dismissed on the ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction over a nonresident of New York City who committed an
assault beyond its geographical borders.21 Within six months after the
dismissal, but more than one year after the assault, plaintiff commenced
a new action in the Supreme Court, Queens County. Defendant invoked the statute of limitations; plaintiff relied upon CPLR 205(a). Special term dismissed the action, reasoning that in the absence of personal
jurisdiction in the prior action a timely action had not been commenced. The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed, ruling
that plaintiff's error in selecting the proper forum was distinguishable
from the failure to properly serve the defendant: it is only in the latter
instance that no action is deemed to have been timely commenced.
It has been posited that Erickson v. Macy 22 established the generic
rule that CPLR 205 does not apply when an action has been dismissed
for lack of personal jurisdiction. 23 Nevertheless, as indicated in Amato,
the pivotal consideration in determining the availability of CPLR 205
relief is whether the defendant has been properly served and apprised
of the pendency of an action before the statute of limitations has run.
If the court is satisfied that these conditions have been met, then CPLR
205 should be employed to defeat a statute of limitations objection.
CPLR 208: Surviving spouse is one "entitled to commence an action"
even though incapacity prevents her appointment.
Although the Estates, Powers & Trusts Law unambiguously prescribes that a wrongful death action must be commenced within two
years from the date of death,24 a problem arises where, for one reason or
another, the sole distributee is incapacitated. Under CPLR 208 the statute of limitations is tolled during a disability due to infancy, insanity
or imprisonment.2 5 However, the person "entitled to commence" a
wrongful death action within the meaning of section 208 is not the distributee but the personal representative. 26 Hence, the representative
164 N.Y.L.J. 66, Oct. 2, 1970, at 17, col. 5 (2d Dep't).
CCA § 404.
22 236 N.Y. 412, 140 N.E. 938 (1923).
23 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 205, supp. commentary at 49 (1964).
24 N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967).
25 Since the period of limitations is less than three years for a wrongful death action,
there would be a toll for the entire period of the disability for an infant and for a maximum of ten years for an incompetent or imprisoned party. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 208,
supp. commentary at 58 (1967).
26 N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967).
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